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Three Essays on Labor
Market Analysis
Patrick M. Kline
This dissertation examines the influence of exogenous
price changes on equilibrium behavior in three distinct
settings. The first essay investigates the dynamic impact of
oil price shocks on the employment and wages of production workers in the U.S. Oil and Gas Field Services (OGFS)
industry. The second essay, with Matias Busso, evaluates
Round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ)
program. The third essay examines the impact of juvenile
curfew laws on adolescent criminal behavior.
All three papers deal with the mechanisms by which
inherently local markets adjust to exogenous changes in
the economic environment. The findings of each strand of
research have policy implications that extend beyond the particular market studied.

Understanding Sectoral Labor
Market Dynamics
The essay on dynamic equilibrium in the oil industry
empirically examines the sectoral reallocation process by
means of a case study. The oil industry is an interesting case
to study for a number of reasons. First, given the debate over
the potential macroeconomic effects of oil, it is of interest to
see whether the price of oil has important allocative effects
on the industry to which it is most directly tied (see, for example, Barsky and Kilian [2002, 2004] and Hamilton [1983,
1988, 2003]). Second, the OGFS is a nonunionized, highturnover industry requiring little formal training for production workers. In this sense, it approximates a neoclassical
spot market for labor. To the extent that important adjustment
rigidities are found in this market, they are likely to represent
a lower bound on the sort of rigidities found in more specialized labor markets with important training requirements
and durable employment relationships. Finally, the immense
changes in the price of crude petroleum over the time period
in question provide ample exogenous variation in labor
demand with which to examine the performance of standard
models of adjustment. Indeed, over the first 10 years of the
study, employment in the oil industry almost quadrupled as a
result of the oil crises of the 1970s.
Using a simple econometric specification, it is found that
labor quickly reallocates across sectors in response to price
shocks, but that substantial wage premia are necessary to
induce such reallocation. Surprisingly, these wage premia
emerge quite slowly, peaking only as labor adjustment ends
and then slowly dissipating. This is puzzling for conventional
market clearing models, most of which would require wages
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to jump on impact in order to attract such large initial inflows
of workers and slowly fall as the wage premia are arbitraged
away.
Thus, the fundamental question becomes, what signals
serve to marshal resources to the sectors in which they are
needed most? The answer provided is that features of the
labor market other than the contemporaneous wage can, in
equilibrium, serve as credible signals for use by agents in
making sectoral migration decisions. To formalize this idea,
a dynamic market clearing model with forward-looking
agents and industrywide adjustment rigidities is proposed.
The parameters of the model are structurally estimated and
used to simulate responses to hypothetical oil price shocks.
The exercise demonstrates that a neoclassical labor market
with reasonable technological parameters and preferences
can yield equilibrium wage and employment dynamics that
look quite similar to what is observed empirically for the oil
industry over this time period.
The core insight of the model is relatively straightforward.
Forward-looking agents with rational expectations will make
decisions based not just upon the current wage, but upon
other variables such as oil prices which are, in equilibrium,
capable of predicting future wages. This implies that the
intersectoral elasticity of labor supply hinges crucially upon
expectations. Workers will be less eager to switch into a sector that is experiencing a transitory increase in labor demand
than a sector in which demand is expected to be persistently
higher, for in the latter case, wage premia are expected to last
much longer, and the chance of needing to leave the sector in
the future is lower.
In the data, oil shocks appear to be heavily persistent. So
when the price of oil rises it signals that the value of being
employed in the oil industry has risen substantially. This
means that, ceteris paribus, the reservation wages of workers considering switching into the industry actually fall on
impact because workers expect good things from oil employment in the future. Thus, equilibria can emerge where the
compensation of workers for their sectoral switching costs
is deferred. Such equilibria are easily found in environments
where sectoral labor demand responds sluggishly, for in such
cases the rightward shift of the labor supply curve on news
of an oil price increase is initially cancelled out by a rightward shift of the industrywide labor demand schedule, yielding stagnant wages alongside large employment increases.
But as the adjustment process continues, demand eventually
outstrips supply and wages rise, thereby confirming the
original beliefs justifying the initial shift in the labor supply
schedule. Eventually these wage premia die out as the sector
grows toward a new steady state size.
The equilibrium model developed in this essay is important for economists seeking to understand the reallocation
process. First, in such a model, standard instruments for
labor demand do not identify stable labor supply parameters.
The impact of a labor demand shifter such as the price of
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oil on employment will, in equilibrium, depend upon the
technological features of production in the industry governing how quickly the demand for labor can adjust to changes
in the productivity of the workforce. Second, the exercise
demonstrates that the sluggish response of factor prices to
productivity shocks need not signal wage rigidity. Rather,
such behavior is compatible with market clearing models
with reasonable parameter values. This is important not only
because economists seek to better understand the mechanisms governing the reallocation process, but because market
clearing models generally imply more efficient behavior than
sticky wage models. Finally, the paper constitutes a methodological advance in the study of dynamic equilibrium models
of sectoral choice. The dynamic discrete choice problem
of individual workers is coupled with the dynamic labor
demand problem of firms and solved in a rational expectations environment under uncertainty. Thus, the equilibrium
stochastic process characterizing wages and employment
emerges out of the solution technique. Previous work on this
subject has only considered serious dynamics on one side
of the labor market or has relied upon solving social planning problems without specifying how the solutions to such
problems are decentralized. The methods developed here are
quite easily generalizable to other environments, including
models of interregional migration and local labor markets.

Empowerment Zones
Local economic development programs are an important
yet understudied feature of the U.S. tax and expenditure system. Bartik (2002) estimates that state and local governments
spend $20–$30 billion per year on economic development
programs, with an additional $6 billion per annum coming
from the federal government. However, little academic work
has been done evaluating the impact of these efforts on local
communities, largely because of the small scale and general
diversity of most such programs (see Bartik [1991] and Nolan and Wong [2004] for a review). This essay (which is joint
work with Matias Busso) evaluates the federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, which constitutes one of the
largest standardized federal interventions in impoverished
urban American neighborhoods since President Johnson’s
Model Cities program.
With a mandate to revitalize distressed urban communities, the EZ program represents a nexus between social
welfare policy and economic development efforts. Unlike
conventional antipoverty programs, Empowerment Zones
aim to help the poor by subsidizing demand for their services
at local firms, which has made them one of the few social
welfare programs popular with conservatives. In an era
where nonentitlement spending on social welfare programs
has been scaled back dramatically, the federal Empowerment
Zone program has enjoyed rapid growth. After the initial
funding of eight first-round EZs in 1994, 15 more cities were
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awarded zones in 1999, followed by another 9 in 2001. An
additional 49 urban areas were concurrently granted smaller
Enterprise Communities (ECs), which entailed a reduced
package of benefits. The enthusiasm for spatially targeted tax
credits has led to the birth of a variety of new zones, each
modifying the original EZ concept in different ways.1
Most recently, the justification for tax abatement zones
has been expanded to include disaster relief. For example, in
the wake of the September 11th attacks, parts of New York
city were designated “Liberty Zones” and granted a variety
of localized tax credits. Then, in 2006, Congress passed
legislation authorizing a set of “Gulf Opportunity Zones” for
areas stricken by Hurricane Katrina.
These recent forays of the IRS into the business of local
economic development should merit the attention of economists. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1999) estimates
that the first round Empowerment Zones will cost $2.5
billion over the course of the 10-year program. Given that
EZ neighborhoods have a total population of under a million
people, subsidies of this magnitude, when directed to such
relatively small urban areas, might be expected to have important effects upon the behavior of firms and workers.
This essay uses four decades of census data on local
neighborhoods in conjunction with proprietary EZ application data obtained from HUD to assess the impact of Round
I EZ designation on 12 local labor and housing market
outcomes over the period 1994–2000.2 Utilizing a semiparametric difference-in-differences estimator suggested by
Abadie (2005), we find that neighborhoods receiving EZ
designation experienced moderate improvements in labor
market conditions and large increases in owner-occupied
housing values and rents relative to rejected and future Empowerment Zones. These effects were accompanied by small
changes in the demographic composition of the neighborhoods, suggesting that some, though not all, of the observed
improvements in EZ neighborhoods are the result of neighborhood churning. No evidence exists of large-scale gentrification, indicating that many of the benefits (and costs) of
the program have been captured by preexisting residents. We
assess the robustness of our results by conducting a series
of false experiments involving the application of the estimator to the decade before the EZs were awarded. We find that
our preferred estimator is remarkably robust, failing to reject
a single false experiment, while alternative estimators that
involve making comparisons within cities are unreliable.
The implications of these findings for the study of local
economic development policies are manyfold. First, it appears that the combination of tax credits and grants can be
moderately effective at stimulating local labor demand in
areas with very low labor force participation rates. Second,
in the case of the EZs, the impact of these demand subsidies
does not seem to have been captured by the relatively well
off; economic development and poverty reduction seem
to have accompanied one another in the manner originally
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hoped for by proponents of the program. Third, while the
treated communities appear to have avoided large-scale
gentrification over the period examined in this study, policymakers should consider carefully the potential impact of
demand-side interventions on the local cost of living. Given
that the vast majority of EZ residents rent their homes, small
changes in the cost of zone living can be expected to impose
large burdens on the roughly two-thirds of the EZ population
who do not work. Trade-offs of this sort should be taken into
account when attempting to determine the incidence of the
EZ subsidies. If authorities wish to use EZs as antipoverty
programs, they may wish to consider combining housing assistance or incentives for the development of mixed income
housing as complements to the tax-based demand-side
subsidies.
As in the first essay, a key question for understanding the
effects of the program is understanding the signals around
which firms and workers are coordinating. The experience
of the Round I EZs suggests that government entities may be
able to play an important role in coordinating expectations
among a wide group of nonprofit, public, and private entities
interested in investing in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The
role of public seed money in leveraging outside investments
in local economic development has been understudied.3 Relatively small grants, in conjunction with substantial political
support at the federal level, seem to have been successful in
leveraging substantial outside investments in Round I EZ
neighborhoods. More research is necessary to understand
the conditions under which such schemes are likely to be
effective.

The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws
In the early 1990s youth curfews became a popular strategy for combating juvenile delinquency. A survey by Ruefle
and Reynolds (1996) found that 146 of the 200 American
cities with populations above 100,000 had curfew laws on
the books, with 110 having enacted or revised curfew laws
between 1990 and 1995. A subsequent study by the U.S.
Conference of Mayors (1997) found that 80 percent of the
347 cities with populations over 30,000 had youth curfew
ordinances.
Despite their popularity with local governments, little is
known about the effects of curfew laws on youth outcomes.
While some research attempts to estimate the effect of curfews on violent crimes committed by and perpetrated against
youths, the findings usually rely on tenuous identifying assumptions (see Adams [2003] for a review of the literature).
Furthermore, existing studies have ignored one of the central
questions involving curfews, which is whether they have
spillover effects on other age groups.
This essay evaluates the effectiveness of curfew ordinances by comparing the arrest behavior of various age groups
within a city before and after curfew enactment. Since cur-
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few ordinances only apply to youth of or below a given age,
usually 16 or 17, young people just above a city’s statutory
maximum curfew age provide a natural control group. However, there are reasons to believe that curfew laws may affect
these exempt age-groups as well. By comparing outcomes
for age-groups several years older than the statutory maximum age to those just above the maximum age, it is possible
to test for the presence of any such spillover effects.
Analyzing both sets of comparisons is important because curfew policies can be thought of as constituting two
treatments, each applying to a different set of age groups.
The first treatment, the statutory treatment, is that of being
subject to a curfew citation, fine, temporary detention, or
whatever punishment is statutorily prescribed for curfew
violations by minors. This treatment only affects those youth
under the statutory curfew age. The second treatment, the
statistical discrimination treatment, is that of being subject to
lower standards of probable cause because of one’s perceived
youth. Police are unlikely to be able to distinguish between
young people just above and below the curfew age. Thus, for
adjacent age groups curfews should raise the probability of
being stopped or searched by an amount that depends very
little on one’s actual age. The possibility of this second effect
is frequently cited by the American Civil Liberties Union as
an argument for reversing such ordinances on the grounds
that they constitute violations of fundamental civil liberties.
Constitutional issues aside, both treatments should be of
interest to economists. The statutory treatment represents the
deterrent effect of the curfew’s statutory sanctions. Identifying this effect tells us how much crime could be reduced
by raising penalties or increasing enforcement of curfew
ordinances. As such, the paper falls into the well-developed
economics literature on optimal fines (see Becker [1968],
Polinsky and Shavell [1984], and Stigler [1970] for theory,
and Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote [2004] for an example of recent
empirical work). It also implicitly provides an estimate of
an important margin in the economics of crime, the substitutability of criminal activity across time.4 Indeed, if, as in
basic economic models (Becker 1968), crime is a purposive
activity, then curfews should only deter delinquency if the
technology used to produce this behavior is imperfectly
substitutable between curfew and noncurfew hours.5 Borrowing from the optimal taxation literature, if the degree
of substitutability is very low, then taxing nocturnal youth
activity may be a viable second-best solution to the problem
of delinquency.
The statistical discrimination treatment tells us the impact of weakening Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable search and seizure. It is well understood by
economists and legal theorists that rights impose costs and
benefits, the distribution of which may not lead to efficiency.
Estimates of this margin are important not only for those
interested in evaluating the costs and benefits of the age discrimination implicit in youth curfews, but those involved in
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the recent debate over racial profiling and national security.
Furthermore, these estimates are closely tied to the elasticity
of criminal behavior with respect to the probability of detection, a key parameter in Becker’s classic model.
Under the assumption that police cannot distinguish between adjacent ages ex-ante, comparisons of the response of
age groups just below the curfew age to those just above will
estimate the statutory treatment effect. Similarly, statistical
discrimination effects can be estimated by comparing the
response of age-groups just above the curfew age to those
several years older.
To summarize the results, the empirical analysis yields
strong evidence of persistent statutory treatment effects on
criminal behavior. Arrests for violent crime and property
crime both appear to fall by around 10 percent in the year
after curfew enactment, with the effects on violent crime
intensifying substantially in subsequent years. No evidence
is found of important spillover effects on either measure of
arrests.
It is interesting to note that these findings are in keeping
with the perceptions of those subject to curfew policies. As
Adams (2003) notes, “Public opinion shows overwhelming
support for curfews . . . the primary basis for [this] support
is the conviction that curfews reduce crime and make the
streets safer.” Though this analysis cannot uncover the exact
mechanism through which curfews affect crime, the large
statutory results suggest youth crime is imperfectly substitutable across time and that temporal targeting of law enforcement policies may be effective.
The lack of noticeable spillover effects has multiple interpretations. One is that police do not statistically discriminate
against youth slightly above curfew age; another is that this
discrimination occurs but is ineffective at reducing crime.
A third interpretation is that statistical discrimination occurs
and is effective, but its effects are masked by negative dependence across age-groups. The first two stories would suggest
that the statutory estimates are truly picking up the deterrent
effect of fines. Since the penalties associated with curfew
violation are generally small, this claim seems dubious. The
third story relies upon a model of crime as a congestible
economic activity, a hypothesis which enjoys little empirical
or theoretical support.
An alternative rationalization of the evidence is that
parents play an important role in the enforcement of curfews
over and above that of police. If municipal curfews act as
focal points in the establishment of household policies, a
curfew with modest fines (and arrests) could lead to large
changes in the behavior of youth. The potential role of parents in self-enforcement of curfews is an important area for
future research.
The more general policy implications of these findings for
criminal justice policy are nuanced. Though curfews appear
to be effective at reducing the incidence of crimes committed
by juveniles, we have little data on the costs of such pro-
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grams, either directly in terms of dollars spent enforcing such
ordinances, or indirectly in terms of the opportunity costs of
policing. Ultimately, the desirability of curfew ordinances
will be context specific. In cities where a large fraction
of youth crime occurs at night and the cost of additional
nighttime policing is low, curfews may be an effective law
enforcement tool.
Notes
1. In addition to urban EZs and ECs, there are a series of rural EZs
and ECs, Enhanced Enterprise Communities (EECs), and 28
urban and 12 rural “Renewal Communities” entitled to benefits
similar in magnitude to EZs.
2. The outcomes are poverty, employment, unemployment, owneroccupied housing values, rents, family earnings, percent of
workers traveling less than 20 minutes to work, population, the
fraction of houses that are vacant, the fraction of the neighborhood that is black, the fraction of residents who live in the same
house as five years ago, and the fraction of residents who hold a
college degree.
3. Andreoni (1998) has modeled the role of seed money in determining charitable contributions. To the author’s knowledge, the
role of seed money in spurring economic development has not
been explored in the academic literature.
4. See Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2004) for an examination of
the substitutability of criminal activity across days as opposed to
within a day.
5. Note that even if youth crime is largely spontaneous and
unplanned, one might still find that curfews have an effect by reducing the preconditions (underage drinking, loitering at night)
that support such impulsive behavior.
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